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WE "HAD A DREAM" IN BROWN v. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
Susan H Bitensky· 
Doctor, Doctor, you had a dream; 
In what eyes do you think 
Your dream was fulfilled? 
Doctor, Doctor, with your skin dark, 
With your eyes full of detennination, 
Was your dream achieved? 
Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.: 
Dreams can come true. 
- William N. Meyrowitz1 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. articulated and brought to public 
consciousness his dream of a nation transformed "into a beautiful 
symphony of brotherhood"2 based on racial equality3 and social 
justice.4 In the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed that Dr. King's dream 
was on its way to realization, not only because of significant strides 
achieved by the civil rights movement,5 but also because of the 
initiative shown by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education. 6 
In Brown,7 a unanimous Court struck down de jure racial segrega-
... Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. B.A., 
Case Western Reserve University, 1971; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1974. This 
article was developed from remarks delivered by the author on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 
birthday, January 15, 1996, as part of the annual Diversity Week program held at the Detroit 
College of Law at Michigan State University. The excellent research assistance of Maryann 
F. Pierce is much appreciated. 
I. William N. Meyrowitz, His Dream (Jan. 1996) (unpublished poem written by 
the author's eleven-year-old son, on file with author). 
2. MARTIN LU1HER KING, JR., I Have a Dream Speech (Aug. 28, 1963), in I HAVE 
A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED TIlE WORLD 102, 105 (James M. 
Washington ed., 1992) [hereinafter I HAVE A DREAM]. 
3. Id. at 102-04. MARTIN LUTIlER KING, JR., Speech on The Rising Tide of Racial 
Consciousness (Sept. 6, 1960) (abridged), in I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 2, at 64, 71; 
MARTIN LU1HER KING, JR., Speech Before the Youth March for Integrated Schools (Apr. 18, 
1959), in I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 2, at 35,35. 
4. MARTIN LU1HER KING, JR., Letter From A Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), re-
printed in I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 2, at 84,89-91; MARTIN LUTIlER KING, JR., A Time 
to Break Silence Speech (Apr. 4, 1967), in I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 2, at 136, 149-50. 
5. MARTIN LU1HER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM passim (1958). 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. This decision is commonly referred to as Brown I in contradistinction to a 
subsequent decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown If'), in 
which the Court undertook the task of fashioning a remedial response to the constitutional 
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tion in the public elementary and secondary schools as inherently 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.8 Brown made it untenable to argue 
that state authorization of racially "separate but equal,,9 schools is 
constitutionally justifiable. 10 In other words, under Brown, official 
racial segregation is a per se constitutional violation even if a 
defendant were to introduce evidence showing that the schools serving 
Caucasian children and the schools serving African-American children 
are provided with equal "buildings, curricula, qualifications and 
salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors."ll The linchpin for 
this holding is the Court's factual finding that separation of children 
into public elementary and secondary schools according to racial 
identity is interpreted by the African-American students as denoting 
their inferiority; this sense of inferiority, in turn, undermines 
motivation to leam. 12 
violations announced in Brown. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 294. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
first Brown v. Board of Education decision will hereinafter be referred to as Brown. 
8. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
9. The notion that facilities could be separate for the races and, at the same time, 
equal was first embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896). In Plessy, the Court upheld under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Louisiana's racial segregation of railroad passengers. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-
49,552. 
10. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
11. Id. at 492. Indeed, during the course of the Brown litigation, the courts below 
had concluded that the segregated schools in issue were "equalized, or are being equalized" 
with respect to tangible resources. Id. at 492 & n.9. (Brown was a consolidated opinion 
deciding cases litigated in the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Id. 
at 486 & n.l). 
12. Id. at 494. The Court took judicial notice of this fact, stating: 
To separate [children in public elementary and secondary schools] from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds 
in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educa-
tional opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court 
which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: 
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction oflaw, therefore, 
has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental development of negro 
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a 
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Brown is a landmark case in the truest sense: the decision was a 
drastic departure from precedent13 as well as a major step in the 
Court's social reform agenda. 14 Nevertheless, the expectations and 
aspirations naturally inspired by Brown have, after forty-two years, 
remained substantially unfulfilled. IS Implementation of Brown has 
posed complex problemsl6 and, no doubt, the shortfall may be 
attributed to many causes. 17 Ironically, one culprit has been the 
racial(ly) integrated school system." 
Id. 
13. Brown represented a breakthrough insofar as it repudiated the doctrine that 
governmentally sanctioned "separate but equal" facilities for African-Americans pass muster 
under the Equal Protection Clause. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 16-15, at 1475-76 (2d ed. 1988); Paul R. Dimond, Panel I: Brown and the Transformation 
of the Constitution: Concluding Remarks, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 29,29-30 (1992). However, 
before Brown, the Court had struck down several state statutes that segregated the races in 
the educational context; these decisions were based on evidence that institutions serving 
African-Americans did not provide equivalent benefits or that such"institutions did not exist 
rather than on the theory that "separate but equal" schools is a contradiction in terms. See, 
e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (invalidating state prohibition of African-
American enrollment in a state law school where an alternative state law school for African-
Americans was of inferior quality); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding 
that a state law school may not deny admission to an applicant solely because of race); 
Missouri ex rei. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (requiring that state-provided legal 
education must be made available to African-Americans as well as Caucasians). 
14. MARTIN LUTIIER KING, JR., Facing the Challenge of a New Age Speech (May 
17, 1957), reprinted in I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 2, at 15, 18-19; ROSEMARY C. 
SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN TIffi 
POST BROWN ERA 3-4 (1986); Louis H. Pollak, The Limitless Horizons of Brown v. Board 
of Education, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 19-22 (1992). 
15. JONATHAN KOZOl, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 
3-4 (1991); L. SCOTT MILLER, AN AMERICAN IMPERATIVE: ACCELERATING MINORIIY 
EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT 200 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The 
Burger Court and the Failure to Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. 
REv. 999, 1001-03 (1994); Richarde W. Donelan et aI., The Promise of Brown and the 
Reality of Academic Grouping: The Tracks of my Tears, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 376,376-77 
(1994); Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The ConstitutionalGhetto, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 
627,643,677-87 (1993); Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE 
LJ. 1285, 1285-86, 1289-91 (1992); Nathaniel R. Jones, Milliken v. Bradley: Brown's 
Troubled Journey North, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 49-55 (1992); Donald E. Lively, The 
Effectuation and Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern Problems in a Post-
DesegregationSociety,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 117, 117, 125, 136 (1987). 
16. See Hayman & Levit, supra note 15, at 636-52; Jarvis, supra note 15, at 1285-87, 
1303-04; Lively, supra note 15, passim; Robert A. Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken 
v. Bradley, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1693, 1698-1702 (1987). 
17. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 15, at 119-20 (attributing continued gaps in 
academic performance between children of different races to, among other things, differing 
HeinOnline -- 1996 Det. C.L. Rev. 4 1996
4 Law Review [1:1 
Court itself. Its post-Brown school desegregation cases have, in the 
long run, limited the possibilities for mandating desegregation and of 
thereby providing equal educational opportunities through the mixing 
of the races. IS However, it is the purpose of this article to show that 
the disappointing denouement also derives, in significant measure, 
from the Court's betrayal of Brown's other promise--its "'educational 
rationale. ",19 
While the Brown opinion is suffused with subtleties that have made 
its meaning a subject of much debate,20 there can be no question that 
the decision invalidated state-imposed racial segregation of public 
amounts of "intergenerationally accumulated [familial] resources"); Rodney J. Blackman, 
Returning to Plessy, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 767, 776-77, 794 (1992) (suggesting that modern 
inequities in educating children stem from the fact that minority families are effectively 
trapped in economically depressed areas); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE 
L.J. 585, 608-13, 626 (1983) (assigning some responsibility for the failure to fulfill Brown's 
promise to the type of remedial decree issued in Brown II); Chris Hansen, Are the Courts 
Giving Up? Current Issues in School Desegregation, 42 EMORY L.J. 863, 864-69 (1993) 
(blaming Brown's impotence on judicial frustration and impatience). 
18. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Do African-AmericansNeed Immersion Schools?: The 
Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. 
REv. 813,817-18 (1993); Hansen, supra note 17, at 867-69; Hayman & Levit, supra note 
15, at 638-56; Jarvis, supra note 15, at 1285-86, 1289-91; Lively, supra note 15, at 125-27. 
19. Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken - On 
Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 535, 543 (1975) (citations omitted). Professor Sedler writes: "The Supreme Court 
in Brown had proceeded upon the educational rationale that racial segregation was harmful 
to black children because it deprived them 'of some of the benefits they would receive in a 
racially integrated school system.'" Id. at 548 (quoting Brown, 347 U. S. at 494-95). 
20. Compare Miriam P. Gladden, The Constitutionality of African-American Male 
Schools and Programs, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 239, 240-41 (1992-93) (arguing that 
Brown represents the formal abolition of apartheid in the United States and establishes the 
principle that African-Americans should not be disadvantaged in their education) andHayman 
& Levit, supra note 15, at 636 (maintaining that Brown is a call to uproot racism and make 
the white majority less convinced of its own superiority) and Lively, supra note 15, at 118 
(contending that a central point of Brown is to delegitimate racially identifiable schools 
because racial separation causes Mrican-American children to feel inferior and thereby 
interferes with their educational opportunity) with Sedler, supra note 16, at 1693 (proposing 
that Brown invalidated all state-imposed racial segregation and the official structure of 
societal racism in the southern United States). Indeed, one commentator has observed with 
respect to Brown, that "[t]he lack of clarity as to which was the ratio decidendi . .. created 
the conditions in which later confusion would flourish." Brian K. Landsberg, Equal Edu-
cationalOpportunity: The Rehnquist Court Revisits Green and Swann, 42 EMORY L.J. 821, 
825 (1993). See also Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 
61 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 23, 28 (1992) (referring to the competing visions and consequent 
ambiguity inherent in Brown). 
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elementary and secondary schools. Given this holding, it would defy 
common sense to suggest that the Brown Court was not after racial 
desegregation of the schools for desegregation's sake.21 If this were 
the sum total of Brown's meaning, that contribution alone to equal 
protection jurisprudence and race relations would be of monumental 
proportions.22 
But the Court was also after more than desegregation for desegrega-
tion's sake. The Brown decision was contextual and that context was 
a concern for the standard of education in the public schools. De-
segregation that would result in racially mixed schoolhouses offering 
substandard education would be an incomplete, if not perverse, 
realization of Brown's import. Indeed, the Brown opinion elucidates 
that the type of education with which the Justices were most con-
cerned, 
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good 
21. See Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination 
of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 1105, 1105-06 (1990); Gewirtz, supra note 17, at 588; Lively, supra note 15, at 117-
19; Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1041, 1041, 1043 (1984); John M. Jackson, Comment, Remedyfor Inner 
City Segregation in the Public Schools: The Necessary Inclusion of Suburbia, 55 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 415, 416 (1994). 
22. Generally speaking, Brown furthered the perception that race does not make 
people unequal. Hayman & Levit, supra note 15, at 635-36; Jarvis, supra note 15, at 1288; 
Sedler, supra note 16, at 1693. See SALOMONE, supra note 14, at 200. Cf Denise C. 
Morgan, What Is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law? The Right to Minimally Adequate 
Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLETIER 1. 99, 107 (1991) (noting that it was not until Brown that 
African-Americans realized that racial segregation was but a by-product of a "more 
pernicious disease - white supremacy"). In this sense, Brown has had a pedagogic effect even 
apart from the remedial decrees of Brown II. Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal 
for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public 
Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 769, 803-04 (1995); Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as 
Intellectualand Moral Associations, 1993 B.Y.V. L. REv. 605,609-10. See Stephen Arons 
& Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique 
of Schooling, 15 HARv. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 309, 323, 349 (1980); but see Kevin Brown, Has 
the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 56-60 (1992) (contending that the values lesson of Brown may have 
been adverse to the interests of African-American children since the decision assumes that 
only minority children need to or will profit from integrated schooling). Insofar as Brown 
and subsequent school desegregation cases have resulted in increased racial integration, there 
is evidence that the experience for all children of interacting with other races has improved 
interracial relationships. See Hayman & Levit, supra note 15, at 717,724-25; James S. 
Liebman, DesegregatingPolitics: "All-Out" DesegregationExplained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 
1463, 1570-71, 1643-44 (1990); contra Shane, supra note 21, at 1058-59. 
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citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of an education.23 
[1:1 
The Brown Court was not concerned that segregation deprives 
African-American children of substandard learning, but rather, that 
such a policy deprives them of quality learning.24 Brown's "educa-
tional rationale" is that de jure segregated public schools cheat these 
children of educational content that would prepare them for responsi-
ble political participation, initiate them into the ranks of the culturally 
literate, and give them the basis for later professional training. 25 As 
such, Brown promises educational quality, linking it with the potential 
for adult success; it is the caliber of the adults into which children 
will mature, even more than children's mental well-being during 
childhood, which drives the decision.26 Thus, Brown's agenda 
23. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). 
24. Commentators have not infrequently identified quality education as one of the 
rationales and aims of Brown. E.g., David Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the 
ConstitutionalRight of Equal Educational Opportunityand an Appropriate Remedial Process, 
63 B.U. L. REv. 1,5,8-9 (1983); Donelan, supra note 15, at 377; Paul Gewirtz, Choice in 
the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 
774-75 (1986); Gladden, supra note 20, at 240; Jarvis, supra note 15, at 1287; James S. 
Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollec-
tion, and LitigativelyEnforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 396 (1990); Lively, 
supra note 15, at 1287. See SALOMONE, supra note 14, at 201-02. But see Morgan, supra 
note 22, at 106-07 (asserting that the Brown Court did not refer to harm caused by inadequate 
education). 
25. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See Beverley Anderson, Permissive Social and Educa-
tional Inequality 40 Years After Brown, 63 J. NEGRO EouC. 443, 444 (1994). 
26. I do not mean to suggest that the Court was insensitive to children in deciding 
Brown. Clearly, that was not the case, for the Justices wrote with evident compassion that 
segregated public schooling "generates [in African-American children] a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. The inference is that the Justices were in some 
degree moved by the potential for damage to children's hearts and minds during childhood 
as well as to damage that was "unlikely ever to be undone" in adulthood. However, the 
Court's full discourse on the value of education makes it plain that it is education as a key 
to adult fulfillment that is at the heart of Brown. ld. at 493; Chang, supra note 24, at 33-34; 
Marvin P. Dawkins & JomiIls H. Braddock II, The Continuing SignificanceofDesegregation: 
School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. 
NEGRO. Eouc. 394,394,403 (1994); Shane, supra note 21, at 1050, 1053. See Anderson, 
supra note 25, at 445,448; Donelan, supra note 15, at 377; Gladden, supra note 20, at 239-
40. Cf Jarvis, supra note 15, at 1288 (stating that Brown has had the effect of helping 
African-Americans to "claim their right to national citizenship"). But see Brown, supra note 
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includes elevating quality public education to a constitutional interest 
under the Equal Protection Clause27 --particularly that quality which 
is the means of empowering future generations of adults. 
The legal standard which, it would seem, should follow from this 
premise is that meaningful equal protection must involve the public 
schools in providing children with that proportion of quality education 
as would equally enable each child, within his or her innate potential, 
to partake of professional training and of the nation's cultural and 
political life upon reaching adulthood. This, in addition and as a 
complement to desegregation, is the other central tenet of Brown 
reduced to its formulaic logic. Providing each student with such a 
"proportion of quality education" would allow those African-Ameri-
can children whose education is in greatest need of enhancements to 
receive them, regardless of the equivalency of inputs into different 
schools.28 The quality education provided "would equally enable" 
22, at 56-57, 76-80 (arguing that Brown may have actually impeded Mrican-American 
empowerment because the Court focused on the idea that segregation retards the intellectual 
development only of minority children). 
27. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding to the contrary in San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), some state and lower federal courts construed 
Brown to signify that there is a fundamental positive right to education under the Federal 
Constitution. E.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-83, 
285 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 
874-75 (D. Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187,214 (N.J. Super. 1972). See also 
Chang, supra note 24, at 57-58 (stating that Brown treated education as a preferred 
constitutional value); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School 
Finance Reform, 48 V AND. L. REv. 101, 117 & n.77 ( 1995) (observing that during the early 
1970s, courts, in deciding educational financing cases, repeatedly relied upon Brown to find 
that education is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause); Michael Klarman, An InterpretiveHistory of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. 
L. REv. 213, 238-39 (1991) (asserting that in writing the Brown opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren considered education to be a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution). 
28. See Chang, supra note 24, at 44-45; Liebman, supra note 24, at 377-78. Cf 
SALOMONE, supra note 14, at 202-03 (contending that in order to operationalize the equality 
mandate of Brown, what is needed is understanding that "equality for all means different or 
more is equal for some"). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have 
issued decrees in desegregation cases authorizing compensatory or remedial education 
programs as a remedy for de jure school segregation. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977) ("Millikenlf'); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 
787 (6th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,427-30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 935 (1976); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 741-43 (N.D. Tex. 1981) aff'dinpart, 
rev 'd in part, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. 
Supp. 657,671-72 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351,357 (E.D. 
Mo. 1980), affd, 667 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981). 
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so as to furnish the condition precedent for each child, upon reaching 
maturity, to enjoy the nation's economic, political and intellectual 
vitality;29 each child necessarily would be enabled only "within his 
or her innate potential" since no school can do more.30 Finally, 
although the holding of Brown is a commitment to minorities, all 
"children" should be encompassed by the standard, as a matter of 
policy and logic, on the assumption that a Court desirous of improv-
ing the educational level for African-American children would not be 
desirous of diminishing or freezing educational quality below that 
level for other children.3) That is undoubtedly why Chief Justice 
. Warren's Brown opinion includes forceful dicta on the importance of 
education with reference to children in general, stating that "it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed" 
without education, and that where the state provides education it "is 
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. "32 
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text. Cf 
Chang, supra note 24, at 31 (asserting that Brown's "definition of equal educational 
opportunity envisions a school system that will enable minority students to learn as 
effectively as do whites") (emphasis added). 
30. It is probably stating the obvious to point out that with respect to educating 
elementary and secondary school children, "[e]quality of results is limited by ... differences 
in individual potentiaL" SALOMONE, supra note 14, at 202. 
31. Charles B. Vergon, Epilogue: Brown at the Threshold of the 21st Century: 
Enduring or Withering Legacy?, 63 J. NEGRO EouC. 482, 485 (1994). See also Maria L. 
Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshal/'s Desegregation Opinions, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 69, 88 (1992) (remarking that Justice Marshall favored school integration "because it 
confers positive benefits on all children"). In light of the language of the Brown opinion, it 
would be illogical, to say nothing of politically disastrous, to argue that the constitutional 
education interest protected by the decision can only benefit African-Americans or other 
minority groups. One commentator, noting that by the year 2000 the majority of children 
in some states will be Hispanic, has suggested that an '"anti-caste''' principle informs Brown 
such that "the legal basis for the claim of discrimination must be broad enough to include all 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups." Paul R. Dimond, Panel II: Civil Rights and Education 
After Brown: Concluding Remarks, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 63, 65, 66 (1992). Another 
commentator has criticized Brown's apparent focus on the benefits of desegregation for 
African-American children rather than all children because Brown, so understood, perpetuates 
the prejudicial notion that African-Americans are inferior. Brown, supra note 22, at 67-69. 
He states, "If African-Americans were as good as Caucasians, then both blacks and whites 
should be beneficiaries of remedies for de jure segregation." Id. at 68. Although Professor 
Brown's analysis is astute in uncovering a hidden and repugnant assumption undergirding 
Brown, it is arguable that his analysis overlooks a counterweight in the form of the education 
interest which Brown protects on behalf of all children. See supra notes 23-28 and 
accompanying text. 
32. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
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Lamentably, Brown's promise of proportionate equality of quality 
education along these lines has not been kept, either for the African-
Americans to whom the promise was specifically made or for others 
who have implicitly stood to benefit from its full implementation. It 
is unlikely that the Justices who decided Brown had in mind a school 
experience that, taken in the aggregate, could legitimately be 
characterized as a national education crisis. However, a brief 
sampling of even a few recent statistics suffices to· convey the 
existence of such a crisis/3 the breadth and depth of which have 
taken on disturbing proportions.34 For example, as of 1994, half of 
the college graduates in this country could not read a bus schedule; 
only forty-two percent of them could summarize a newspaper article 
or accurately compare two editorials.35 Consider that the readers 
used in the sixth, seventh, and eighth grades during 1993 are simpler 
and less demanding than school readers used before World War II, 
while the readers used in the fourth and fifth grades during 1993 are 
less difficult than comic books.36 According to a 1993 study, 
twenty-five percent of high school seniors had a hard time decipher-
ing their diplomas.37 A 1992 survey found that high school seniors 
could correctly answer elementary questions in the field of economics 
only thirty-five percent of the time.38 It should thus come as no 
surprise that SAT verbal scores dropped fifty-four points and math 
scores dropped twenty-three points during the period from 1962 to 
1994.39 When the performance of American students is compared 
to that of children in other countries, the picture becomes even more 
dismal. "By virtually every measure of achievement, American 
students lag far behind their counterparts in both Asia and Europe, 
especially in math and science. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
33. As to the existence of the crisis, see generally CHARLES 1. SYKES, DUMBING 
DOWN OUR KIDs: WHY AMERICAN CHILDREN FEEL GOOD ABOUT THEMSEL YES BUT CAN'T 
READ, WRITE, OR ADD passim (1995); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations/or a 
Right to Education Under the u.s. Constitution: A Beginning to the End 0/ the National 
Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 551-52, 554-61 (1992); but see DAVID C. 
BERLINER & BRUCE 1. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS: MYTHS, FRAUD, AND THE 
ATTACK ON AMERICA'S PuBLIC SCHOOLS passim (1995) (claiming that, in large measure, the 
education crisis is a fiction manufactured for political purposes). 
34. Bitensky, supra note 33, at 551-52. 
35. SYKES, supra note 33, at 100-01. 
36. Id. at 129. 
37. Id. at 21. 
38. Id. at 22. 
39. Id. 
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they are falling farther and farther behind. ,,40 Adding insult to the 
historical injury of racial segregation, the crisis is most glaringly 
manifested in underfinanced school districts of which many are urban 
centers with high concentrations of impoverished minority children.41 
This ongoing deterioration necessarily raises the question as to 
why Brown's promise of proportionate equality of quality education 
has not eradicated or mitigated the situation. Surely if that promise 
had been fulfilled, especially in conjunction with fulfillment of 
Brown's commitment to desegregation, the statistics would be very 
different. If the promise were kept, not only would high school 
graduates be able to read their diplomas, they might well be able to 
use their degrees to pursue professional careers and participate in the 
nation's political and cultural affairs--regardless of race or socioeco-
nomic status. The dream we had in Brown v. Board of Education 
has, at best, become "a dream deferred. ,,42 
The explanation for the decision's impotence as an agent of 
educational quality may be found, at least in part, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's retreat from Brown's education guarantee in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.43 Rodriguez was 
a class action brought on behalf of Mexican-American schoolchildren 
who challenged that component of Texas' system of financing public 
education based on local property taxes.44 The gravamen of the 
complaint was that Texas had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause insofar as this aspect of the financing scheme 
caused school districts with low property tax bases to receive less 
funds than districts with higher property tax bases.45 
Plaintiffs-appellees urged the Supreme Court to review the 
challenged legislation under the strict scrutiny standard, the most 
stringent measure of a statute's constitutionality, and therefore, the 
most favorable standard of review available to them.46 However, in 
order to successfully invoke strict scrutiny, plaintiffs were required by 
40. Id. at 16. 
41. BERLINER & BIDDLE, supra note 33, at 218-19, 232, 260, 264-69; KOlOL, supra 
note 15, at 3, 23-39, 43-80, 83-115, 119-32, 137-74, 181-90, 198-205, 223-33. See Enrich, 
supra note 27, at 104, 124. 
42. LANGSTON HUGHES, Dream Boogie, in SELECTED POEMS 221 (1987). 
43. 411 U.S. I (1973) (5-4 decision). 
44. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4, 17-41, 47. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 17, 28-29. Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Texas statutes 
would be upheld only if the state could show that the statutes furthered some compelling state 
interest. Id. at 16-17. 
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the Court to meet one of two criteria: either the challenged law must 
infringe upon a fundamental right under the Constitution, or the law 
must adversely affect a suspect class.47 In considering the first 
criterion, the Court confronted head-on the question of whether a 
positive right to education exists under the U.S. Constitution.48 
As it happens, the U.S. Constitution is silent on the issue of 
education. The Rodriguez Justices acknowledged, however, that such 
silence is not by itself dispositive.49 The fact is that the Supreme 
Court has recognized an extensive array of implied rights over the 
years. 50 I have discussed elsewhere the Rodriguez Court's analytical 
approach in deciding whether to recognize a positive right to 
education under the Federal Constitution.51 For purposes of this 
article, it suffices to point out that the Rodriguez majority ruled that 
a positive fundamental right to education is not among the panoply of 
rights afforded implicit protection under the Constitution. 52 This 
was the sleight of hand that broke Brown's promise of quality 
education; Rodriguez simply withdrew the promise without even 
mentioning that Brown had been in any way affected. 53 
47. Id. at 17. 
48. Id. at 29. 
49. Id. at 33-34. The Court stated that the test for discerning a fundamental constitu-
tional right is that the right must be either "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution." (emphasis added) Id. 
50. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (right of as-
sociation); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (right to an open 
criminal trial); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (rights to a presumption of 
innocence and to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt before being convicted of a 
crime); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (the right to marry or not to marry); Carey 
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to make one's own choice about having 
children); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (right to receive 
information); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel interstate); Afroyim 
v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (right to retain American citizenship, in spite of commission 
of criminal activities, until expressly and voluntarily renouncing it); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right 
to vote);' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (right to use the federal courts and to 
advise others to use them); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (right to hold one's own beliefs); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to 
rear children in accordance with parental values and beliefs). 
51. Bitensky, supra note 33, at 564-67. 
52. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
53. John A. Powell, An Agenda/or the Post-CivilRights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 889, 
894 n.25 (1995). See Lively, supra note 15, at 128-29 & n.103. Cf Sedler, supra note 19, 
at 561-62 (intimating that by giving preference to the interests of middle class suburban 
Caucasians in using their tax dollars for education of their own children, Rodriguez set the 
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Nevertheless, the consequence is that Brown has been sundered 
from its education context and substantially eviscerated. Brown, read 
in light of Rodriguez, presumably now stands for the proposition that 
the Equal Protection Clause would be satisfied if the public schools 
were to provide an equality of low quality education or even an 
equality of de minimis education as long as the "education" occurred 
in schoolhouses free of state sanctioned racial segregation. 54 
Interestingly, the signs are that the Rodriguez Court was not 
altogether at ease with what it had done in relation to the right to 
education. The Justices declined to leave the matter in terms of 
unequivocal repudiation. In dicta that one commentator has dubbed 
the "unheld holding" of Rodriguez,55 the Court indicated that, in an 
appropriate case, it might find that there is a right to "some identifi-
able quantum of education" sufficient to provide children with the 
"basic minimal skills" necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of 
speech and full participation in the political process.56 This was no 
slip of the pen. In two subsequent cases addressing the issue of 
whether the education right exists, the Court effectively reiterated the 
"unheld holding" even as it continued to disavow the right. 57 
stage for further desegregation decisions that would ultimately undercut the educational 
benefit protected by Brown). But see Chang, supra note 24, at 34 & n.112 (stating that a 
"performance - oriented interpretation" of Brown is "not inconsistent" with the Rodriguez 
Court's rejection of a positive constitutional right to education). 
54. See generally Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (holding that there is no fundamental 
positive right to education under the U.S. Constitution). 
55. Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful 
Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 75, 75, 78-83 
(1980). 
[d. 
56. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37. The Court stated: 
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitu-
tionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right [to free 
speech or to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational 
expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit 
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an 
absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argu~ent 
provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only 
relative differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each 
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the 
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process. 
57. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1986) (stating that the question of 
whether a fundamental constitutional right to education exists "has not yet [been] definitively 
settled"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (taking the position that while "[p]ublic 
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Perhaps prompted by this continuing sense of unease, the Court 
also subsequently developed a stratagem that allows for periodically 
softening Rodriguez's blow to Brown whenever softening might seem 
in order. That stratagem is well exemplified by the relief ultimately 
ordered in the Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken 1')58 desegregation 
litigation. In Milliken I, decided one year after Rodriguez, the 
Supreme Court rejected a metropolitan-wide multi-district remedy for 
de jure racial segregation within the single-district Detroit public 
school system.59 The Court so held because there was no showing 
that the state or any of the predominantly white suburban school 
districts had caused interdistrict segregation or a segregative effect in 
Detroit. 60 The case was accordingly remanded for reformulation of 
a plan for intradistrict relief "directed to eliminating the segregation 
found to exist in Detroit city schools. ,,61 
In Milliken II, the Supreme Court reviewed the decree resulting 
from the remand, which, in addition to ordering intradistrict student 
reassignments, included "educational sweeteners, ,,62 i. e., court-
ordered educational compensatory or remedial programs.63 Specifi-
cally, the Court approved of the trial court's '''remedial guide-
lines"'64 for the Detroit Board of Education that would assure 
implementation of an educational plan with four components: a 
remedial reading and communications skills program, a comprehen-
sive in-service teacher training program, a testing program devoid of 
racial, ethnic or cultural biases, and a counseling program to advise 
students concerning new vocational and technical school programs. 65 
education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution .... neither is it merely 
some' governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation"); contra Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (noting that 
education has not yet been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right). For an analysis 
as to why the Kadrmas Court's pronouncement on the right to education is dictum, see 
Bitensky, supra note 33, at 570-73. 
58. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) ("Milliken!'); MilIikenlI, 433 U.S. at 267. 
59. MillikenI, 418 U.S. at 721,732-36,744-45,752-53. 
60. Id. at 744-45. 
61. Id. at 753. 
62. Gewirtz, supra note 17, at 653-55. Professor Gewirtz uses the term "educational 
sweeteners" to denote judicial incentives to whites to stay in more racially mixed schools. 
I use his term more broadly to also denote educational enhancement remedies that are 
valuable in themselves and as incentives for African-American acceptance of remedial plans 
inadequately geared toward integration. 
63. MillikenlI, 433 U.S. at 277, 279-88. 
64. Id. at 275 (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 275-77. This four part remedial educational plan had been generated by 
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The Court described the purpose of the plan as restoring children 
victimized by racial segregation to the position they would have 
occupied in the absence of such discrimination.66 
In effect, Milliken II substitutes for the education right repudiated 
by Rodriguez67 judicial discretion to order improvements in the 
quality of education in discrete desegregation cases.68 Comparison 
of the two cases makes a compelling argument for this linkage.69 
On the one hand, Rodriguez denies to all children the power to 
demand, as a matter of federal constitutional right, that the public 
schools provide quality education.70 On the other hand", Milliken II 
gives back to the children victimized by de jure public school 
segregation, and only to those children, the hope that an individual 
judge in an individual school desegregation case may see fit to decree 
under the Equal Protection Clause a remedial or compensatory remedy 
that improves the quality of education in the offending school 
district.71 Whether by design or happenstance, therefore, the Mil-
liken II Court mitigated the harshness of Rodriguez, but with an 
essentially conservative strategy for dealing with the crisis in 
educational quality and race discrimination in the nation's public 
schools.72 Indeed, the Milliken II option may be viewed as a 
the Detroit School Board. Id. at 278. 
66. Id. at 280. 
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
68. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 275-77, 279-88; Preovolos, supra note 55, at 116. 
69. See Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle - Toward a Constitutional 
Standard/or Reviewo/Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1,47 n.176 (1983); Preovolos, supra 
note 55, at 116; Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a Desegregated 
Society?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 60 (1992). 
70. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
71. MilIikenIl, 433 U.S. at 275-77,279-88. Cf Gewirtz, supra note 17, at 656 
(suggesting that courts might refrain from ordering Milliken II relief if they deem it too 
expensive for defendants). 
72. Many commentators characterize the Supreme Court's agenda in rejecting amulti-
district desegregation decree in Milliken I as one of retrenchment from Brown. E.g., 
Hansen, supra note 17, at 870-71; Hayman & Levit, supra note 15, at 643; Jarvis, supra note 
15, at 1290; Jones, supra note 15, at 50; Jackson, supra note 21, at 417. When MillikenI 
is considered in conjunction with Rodriguez, some have even seen in the combination a return 
to Plessy days. The reason for this dire assessment is that while Milliken I may generally 
preclude minority plaintiffs from obtaining an interdistrict desegregation remedy, Rodriguez 
also effectively precludes them from challenging inequities among school districts with 
respect to the financing of education. The result is that African-American children living in 
those poorer school districts segregated along interdistrict lines are unable to make viable 
Equal Protection Clause claims on the basis of either of the two theories logically available-
- unequal treatment in relation to school district financing or unequal treatment in relation 
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political convenience that can be used to forestall the more thorough-
going and controversial reform implicit in Brown's education promise. 
Milliken II, in realpolitik terms, gives the judiciary authority to inject 
educational enhancements into the brew when the combined effects 
of educational deficiencies and school segregation are too severe and 
threaten to make public anger boil over (or before the boiling point 
is reached, in cases where the judge has sufficient foresight or is 
sympathetically inclined toward plaintiffs' claims of educational depri-
vation due to racial discrimination). The point is that Milliken II 
lends itself to being used as a sort of societal safety valve in the 
discretion of the courts in order to give back, in bits and pieces and 
here and there, some of what Rodriguez stole from Brown's promise 
of a better education. 
It would be preposterous to contend that the vitiation of Brown 
and the concomitant deterioration of public schooling is wholly 
attributable to Rodriguez. Societal forces have been operating since 
Brown that are indifferent or hostile to public schools; 73 racial 
bigotry has persisted in the education milieu and elsewhere;74 
controversial remedies for official school segregation, such as busing, 
have sometimes diverted attention from the task of improving educa-
tional quality.75 Even with the best of intentions, state and local 
governments have often been too financially strapped to undertake a 
substantial overhaul of educational standards. 7 Clearly, it is a 
composite of factors than have turned Brown's promise more into 
words of aspiration than commitment. But Rodriguez, without fanfare 
and under cover of Milliken II's softening influence, has figured into 
the process in no minor way. 
The Brown Court and the civil rights movement had a dream. At 
this juncture, the prognosis for its meaningful realization on a national 
to racial segregation. Consequently, these children may be relegated to racially separate and 
qualitatively unequal schools without the possibility of federal judicial intervention. KOZOL, 
supra note 15, at 201-02. See Sedler, supra note 19, at 561-62. If this analysis is sound, it 
should come as nb surprise that Milliken II, as the second stage of the Milliken litigation, 
also has a regressive aspect. 
73. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AMERICA GOES TO SCHOOL: LAW, REFORM, AND 
CRISIS IN PuBLIC EDUCATION 44-45 (1995); Liebman, supra note 24, at 358. 
74. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LmERAL DEMOCRA-
CY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 23 (1984); KOZOL, supra note 15, passim; Derrick Bell, 
Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION passim (Derrick Bell ed., 1980); Gladden, supra note 20, at 
243; Hayman & Levit, supra note 15, at 677-86. 
75. Morgan, supra note 22, at 110-11. See Bell, supra note 74, at 100-01. 
76. Bitensky, supra note 33, at 552-53, 632. 
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scale does not seem to be cause for optimism. Although reform on 
multiple fronts will be essential to the full effectuation of Brown, the 
Supreme Court could, in the next suitable case, make a critical 
contribution to that end by taking advantage of the "unheld holding" 
in Rodriguez, i. e., by overturning Rodriguez and its progeny and 
recognizing an implied positive right to education in the U.S. 
Constitution. As I have explored in detail elsewhere, there is no 
dearth of theoretical bases for judicial recognition of the right,77 and 
there are no insurmountable obstacles either to delineating the quality 
of education guaranteed by the righfS or to its enforcement. 79 
I have also proposed in other writings a formula for the quality of 
education that the right would obligate government to provide.so No 
doubt, a workable and effective paradigm for the content of the right--
the precise level of educational quality mandated--will require the 
study and input of many wise heads. However, this much should be 
borne in mind in the process: the right will be self-defeating if all 
that it guarantees is a low or mediocre quality of education. Only a 
right that aims high will comport with and further the promise of 
Brown. In overturning Rodriguez,S) the Court would help to save 
Brown and would fulfill the young poet's assurance to Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. that these "[d]reams can come true."S2 
77. ld. at 574-630. 
78. ld. at 637-40. 
79. ld. at 640-41. 
80. ld. at 637-40. 
81. The policy as well as legal bases for overturning Rodriguez are set forth in Biten-
sky, supra note 33 passim, and in Susan H. Bitensky, Of Originalism, Reality, and a 
Constitutional Right to Education, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1056 passim (1992). See also 
Liebman, supra note 24, at 423 (noting that the Court might be persuaded to revise its 
Rodriguez ruling on education as a fundamental right). As it is, only a bare majority of the 
Justices supported the Rodriguez decision. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62-133 (Brennan, J., 
White, J., Douglas, J., and Marshall, 1., dissenting). 
82. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
